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Abstract
This paper analyzes the distortions that banks’ cross-border activities, such as for-
eign assets, deposits and equity, can introduce in the regulatory process. We ﬁnd that
while each individual dimension of cross-border activities distorts the incentives of a
domestic regulator, a balanced amount of cross-border activities does not necessarily
cause inefﬁciencies, as the various distortions can offset each other. In the case of im-
balanced cross-border activities, a supranational regulator can improve outcomes, if her
realm matches the geographic activity of banks, her capacity of extracting information
is not lower than that of national supervisors, and the available resolution techniques do
not cause higher external costs than under national resolution. Results from a numerical
simulation exercise and empirical analysis using bank-level data from the recent crisis
provide support to our theoretical ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, banks with a higher share of
foreign deposits and assets and a lower foreign equity share were intervened at a more
fragile state, reﬂecting the distorted incentives of national regulators.
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The problematic resolution of failing cross-border banks in Europe during the current crisis
hasfocusedacademics’andpolicymakers’attentionalikeonthemisalignmentofgeographic
boundaries of banks and their supervision. The resolution of Fortis on the national level,
undertaken separately by Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg authorities has conﬁrmed Charles
GoodhartandMervynKing’spointthat"banksareinternationalinlifeandnationalindeath."
The failure of the Icelandic banks, with wide-ranging economic and political repercussions
has shed doubts on the viability of large multinational banks in small countries. The recent
reform debate has - among other items - focused on issues of national versus supra-national
supervision, the responsibility, obligation and capacity of home country supervisor relative
to host country supervisor to resolve large cross-border banks and, in general, the need to
coordinate the resolution of large international banks across borders. On the political level,
arguments over national sovereignty and the role of European institutions are being used to
argue in favor or against the establishment of a European-level bank supervisory authority.
Recent proposals by the European Commission and the IMF aim at establishing a Europe-
wide supervision and resolution authority (Fonteyne et al, 2010; European Commission,
2010). But what are the distortions of national supervision of international banks? What
are the rationales behind national and supra-national supervisors; what are the trade-offs of
national versus supra-national resolution authority?
This paper ﬁrst presents a simple model to show both beneﬁts and costs of national ver-
sus supra-national supervisors. The model highlights the distorted incentives that purely
national supervisors face when deciding to intervene in failing banks with activity outside
their borders. However, it also highlights potential problems that might arise from having
a supranational supervisor, in terms of higher intervention costs and limited information on
banks’ performance. The model allows us to disentangle various trade-offs between national
and supranational supervision. A numerical exercise suggests that the arising distortions in
regulatory intervention decisions are signiﬁcant.
1Second, we provide empirical evidence for our theoretical model using bank level data
during the crisis of 2007-2009. Speciﬁcally, we study banks that have been intervened during
the crisis. We take their CDS spread at the time of intervention as a measure of regulatory
lenience (a higher spread suggests a more lenient regulator, as the regulator lets bank health
deteriorate signiﬁcantly before intervening). We then relate this measure of lenience to vari-
ous proxies of a bank’s cross-border activities. Consistent with the predictions of our model
we ﬁnd that higher foreign asset and deposit share and lower foreign equity share is asso-
ciated with more lenient regulatory decisions. We also show that non-intervened banks had
- on average - CDS spreads over the three years that were below the threshold predicted by
our model.
Ourpaperisrelatedtoasmallbutgrowingtheoreticalliteratureontheregulationofcross-
border banks.1 Loranth and Morrison (2007) discuss the implications of capital requirements
and deposit insurance for cross-border banks. Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006) show that
competition between national regulators can lead to lower capital adequacy standards, since
national regulators do not take into account the external beneﬁts of higher capital adequacy
standards in terms of higher stability in other countries. Acharya (2003), however, shows that
coordinating capital adequacy ratios across countries without coordinating on other dimen-
sions of the regulatory framework, such as resolution policies, can have detrimental effects.
Freixas (2003) and Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) show that ex-post negotiations on
recapitalization of failing cross-border banks can lead to underprovision of the necessary re-
sources and prove the advantage of ex-ante burden sharing agreements in helping overcome
coordination problems between regulators. Our paper is most closely related to Calzolari
and Loranth (2010) who show how the organization structure of multi-national banks can in-
ﬂuence regulatory behavior. Speciﬁcally, organization of foreign presence through branches
leads to higher incentives to intervene as the home country regulator can draw on all assets,
while at the same time it reduces the incentives if the regulator is responsible for repaying
all deposits, including in foreign branches. There is also a more institutionally oriented liter-
1For an early discussion, see White (1994).
2ature on legal differences across countries in the treatment of domestic and foreign creditors
(e.g. Krimminger, 2007). Osterloo and Schoenmaker (2007) and Schoenmaker (2010) show
the empirical relevance of regulation of cross-border banks within Europe, with an increas-
ing trend. Allen et al. (2011) discuss policy options for the regulation of cross-border banks
in the European Union.
The resolution of cross-border banks during the recent crisis informs our theoretical
model. Intervention into large cross-border banks came often at a late stage and often with
conﬂicts between home and host country supervisors. While the lack of an effective bank
resolution framework in most European countries was certainly an important factor in ex-
plaining the late and uncoordinated intervention into failing bank, incentives for domestic
regulators facing weak international banks have certainly played a role (Claessens et al.,
2010).
This paper contributes to the literature on regulation of cross-border banks by focusing
on one speciﬁc aspect, the intervention decision of supervisors. While the previous literature
has considered capital regulations and deposit insurance across borders, to our best knowl-
edge, this paper is one of the ﬁrst to analyze the implications of cross-border banking for the
intervention into failing banks. In focusing on this speciﬁc aspect, we hold constant other
elements, such as capital requirements and deposit insurance. We also abstract from endoge-
nous risk decisions by banks and market discipline to thus focus exclusively on supervisory
discipline. While the basic set-up of this model is similar to Calzolari and Loranth (2010),
we differ along several dimensions, including the distinction between cross-border activities
in terms of assets, deposits and equity and discussing the merits of a supra-national supervi-
sor. In addition, we provide empirical evidence on regulatory bias in intervention decisions
during the recent crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic
model. Section 3 analyzes the incentives of the national supervisor in the presence of for-
eign deposits, assets and equity, while Section 4 analyzes the incentives and constraints of a
global supervisor. In each case do we derive the welfare implications. Section 5 contains the
3empirical analysis. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The model
We present a simple model of bank supervision, with three periods, 0, 1 and 2. For ease of
analysis, we assume that the discount factor and the deposit interest rate are zero. There is a
single representative bank whose balance sheet is normalized to 1 and that issues debt d and
equity k, so that d + k = 1. In period 0, the bank invests its resources into an investment
project whose success is random and outside the control of the bank. Speciﬁcally, with
probability ￿ (￿ 2 (0;1)), the investment succeeds and yields a return R>1 in period 2, and
with probability 1 ￿ ￿, the project fails and yields zero gross return in period 2.
While the supervisor has imperfect information about ￿ at date 0, ￿ becomes known at
date 1. Based on this information, a supervisor can decide whether to intervene in the bank or
to allow it to continue. If the supervisor decides to intervene in the bank, she can recover the
initial investment of one. This intervention can take different forms, ranging from liquidation
to a purchase and assumption operation involving another bank. The intervention is assumed
to cause costs c1 external to the bank, arising for example from the disruption that depositors
and borrowers might experience during the intervention.2 If the supervisor decides to not
intervene and allows the bank to continue to period 2, with probability ￿ , the bank will be
successful and be able to repay its debt and equity holders. With probability 1 ￿ ￿, the bank
will fail and there are again external costs of c2, which can be lower or higher than c1.
We assume that the supervisor maximizes domestic welfare, thus maximizing returns to
domestic debt and equity minus domestic external costs. In the case of a purely domestic
bank, her intervention decision will hence coincide with the one that maximizes (world)
welfare. The intervention threshold is given by the ￿ which equates the expected returns
2For a discussion on the external costs that bank failure can impose on the remaining ﬁnancial system and
the real economy, see Beck (2011).
4from continuation with the return from immediate liquidation. We have
￿R ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c2 = 1 ￿ c1. (1)
Solving for ￿ gives
￿
￿ =
1 + c2 ￿ c1
R + c2
: (2)
Quite intuitively, we can see that intervention becomes less likely when the date 1 bank
failurecosts, c1, increasebutbecomesmorelikelywhendate2bankfailurecosts, c2;increase
(the latter follows from ￿
￿0(c2) > 0 for ￿ < 1). A higher return R reduces the intervention
probability in period 1.
We can use this model and different interpretations for c1 and c2 to understand inter-
vention decisions by bank regulators. Higher external costs of intervention in period 1 can
stem from an inefﬁcient failure resolution framework that, e.g., does not allow for a purchase
and assumption transaction, and where depositors loose temporarily access to their savings
and borrowers are cut off from external ﬁnancing. Similarly, the size of these external costs
increases in the size of the institutions, as more depositors and borrowers are affected and
the likelihood of contagion to other ﬁnancial institutions increases. At the same time, the
resolution of such an institution is made more difﬁcult.3 An increase to the same extent in
external costs of both c1 and c2 will make intervention in period 1 more likely, while a larger
increase in c1 than in c2 makes intervention in period 1 less likely.
While we assume throughout the paper that ￿ becomes perfectly known at date 1, we
can easily introduce a noisy signal on ￿. As long as the signal is symmetrically distributed
around the true ￿, the intervention threshold is the same. This can be seen by noting that the
costs from intervening are linear in ￿ (left hand side of equation 1). Welfare, however, will
decrease when there is uncertainty about ￿ at date 1, as the regulator will make more Type 1
and Type 2 mistakes, i.e. intervene when she should not, and not intervene when she should.
3See Beck (2011) and Wagner (2010) for discussions on the external costs of bank failures, including how
these costs depend on the number and size of failing banks and the health of remaining surviving banks.
53 The incentives of a national supervisor with cross-border
banking
We now introduce cross-border banking into our model. For this we allow the bank to be
partially ﬁnanced by foreign deposits and foreign equity, as well as having asset holdings
abroad. More speciﬁcally we denote with ￿D the domestic share of deposits, with ￿E the
domestic share of equity and with ￿A the share of domestic ﬁrms (assets) ﬁnanced by the
bank.
The introduction of cross-border banking obviously does not modify the efﬁcient inter-
vention threshold as it does not affect total payoffs in the world economy (thus including for-
eigners). It only affects the share of the payoffs that accrue to domestic agents. As national
supervisors only care about domestic payoffs, this can change the intervention incentives for
the domestic supervisor and drive a wedge between the socially efﬁcient and the domestic
intervention point.
The domestic intervention point can be derived as follows. If the domestic regulator
intervenes at the intermediate date, the bank will be liquidated. Total (world) proceeds from
this are 1 ￿ c1. Domestic depositors obtain ￿Dd and domestic equity obtains ￿E(1 ￿ d)
of these proceeds. In addition, the domestic economy suffers its share of the external costs,
which amount to ￿Ac1. Total payoff in the domestic economy is thus ￿Dd+￿E(1￿d)￿￿Ac1.
In case there is no intervention the bank succeeds with probability ￿. In this case domestic
depositors obtain ￿Dd, while equity obtains ￿E(R ￿ d). With probability 1 ￿ ￿ the bank
fails. In this case both equity and debt holders do not obtain any return and the country
in addition suffers ￿Ac2 due to bank failure costs. Total expected domestic payoff is hence
￿(￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Ac2. The domestic intervention threshold is deﬁned by
￿(￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Ac2 = ￿Dd + ￿E(1 ￿ d) ￿ ￿Ac1. (3)
6Rearranging for ￿ gives
b ￿ =
￿Dd + ￿E(1 ￿ d) + ￿A(c2 ￿ c1)
￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d) + ￿Ac2
. (4)
Note that for ￿D = ￿E = ￿A = 1 we obtain b ￿ = ￿
￿.
3.1 The case of no external costs in period 1
We focus in the following on the case of c1 = 0, i.e. the case of an efﬁcient resolution
scheme. We start with this somewhat simpler case, as for c1 > 0 the comparative statics are
more complex and generally depend on the entire set of parameters. At any rate, external
costs from bank liquidations at date 1 are likely to be signiﬁcantly smaller than in the case
of project failure at date 2 (c1 < c2) because in the former case the supervisor can allow for
an orderly intervention and resolution.
Proposition 1 The intervention threshold of the domestic supervisor, ￿
D, is
i) increasing in the share of domestic deposits ￿D,
ii) decreasing in the share of domestic equity ￿E,
iii) increasing in the share of domestic assets ￿A.





(￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d) + ￿Ac2)2 > 0 (5)




(R ￿ 1)(￿Dd + ￿Ac2)
(￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d) + ￿Ac2)2 < 0. (6)





(￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d) + ￿Ac2)2 > 0. (7)
7The intuition behind these results is as follows.
Deposits. Since the national regulator only cares about domestic depositors, a higher
share of foreign deposits will effectively reduce the costs for her in period 2 and thus make
intervention in period 1 less likely. A higher share of domestic deposits, in turn, makes the
domestic regulator less inclined to gamble on bank success in the second period. Hence, with
a higher share of domestic deposits, the domestic regulator becomes more likely to intervene,
that is, the range of ￿
0s where intervention takes place increases.
Equity. Shareholders have a relatively higher interest in continuing the bank due to the
standard risk-shifting problems (the costs of bank failure are partly borne by debt holders
and ﬁrms). A higher share of domestic shareholders aligns the interests of the regulator
more with the one of shareholders. This makes interventions less likely, that is, the threshold
decreases. If, on the other hand, the share of foreign equity holders is higher, the regulator is
more likely to intervene in period 1.
Assets. The external costs of bank failures incur for c1 = 0 only in period 2. When a
higher share of bank assets is domestically invested, this raises the domestic external costs
of bank failure. This, in turn, makes the domestic regulator more averse to continuation. As
a result, she becomes stricter at date 1 (the minimum required success probability increases).
On the other hand, a higher share of foreign assets involves that a higher share of external
costs in period 2 are being borne by agents outside the home economy, which makes the
regulator more reluctant to intervene in period 1.
Proposition 1 has straightforward welfare implications. We know that for ￿D = ￿E =
￿A = 1, domestic and efﬁcient liquidation thresholds coincide. Since we also know, for ex-
ample, that the domestic liquidation threshold is increasing in the share of domestic deposits,
it follows that whenever ￿D < 1 (and ￿E = ￿A = 1) we have b ￿ < ￿
￿. This implies that
there is a range of ￿ (￿ 2 [b ￿;￿
￿]) where it is efﬁcient to liquidate but the domestic supervisor
decides to let the bank continue to operate (the domestic regulator is then too lenient).
8The following corollary summarizes this welfare result, alongside with the corresponding
ones for foreign equity and assets.
Corollary 2 When there is cross-border banking, domestic and efﬁcient interventions gen-
erally do not coincide. In particular we have:
i) If cross-border banking takes place only via deposits (￿D < 1 and ￿E = ￿A = 1):
there are ranges for ￿ where the domestic regulator lets the bank continue even though this
is inefﬁcient (the domestic regulator is too lenient);
i) If cross-border banking takes place only via equity (￿E < 1 and ￿D = ￿A = 1):
there are ranges for ￿ where the domestic regulator liquidates the bank even though this is
inefﬁcient (the domestic regulator is too strict)
iii) If cross-border banking takes place only via assets (￿A < 1 and ￿D = ￿E = 1):
there are ranges for ￿ where the domestic regulator lets the bank continue even though this
is inefﬁcient (the domestic regulator is too lenient)
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 1 and b ￿ = ￿
￿ for ￿D = ￿E = ￿A = 1.
If cross-border banking takes place through more than one channel, the welfare results
obviously depend on the strength of each channel. For example, if there are both cross-
ownershipofdepositsandequity, thebiasescreatedbyeachchannelgoinoppositedirections
and hence tend to offset each other. If there is mainly foreign deposit-taking but little foreign
ownership, we are then likely to end up with a too lenient domestic regulator, and vice versa.
This implies that in order to evaluate the efﬁciency properties of cross-border banking, one
has to look at all aspects of cross-border banking jointly, and not only at one channel in
isolation.
The following corollary establishes the precise conditions under which regulators are too
lenient or too strict in the presence of cross-border banking.
Corollary 3 Domestic interventions are
i) always efﬁcient if ￿E =
d￿D+￿Ac2￿Rd￿D+R￿Ac1￿R￿Ac2￿d￿Dc1
d+c2+Rc1￿Rc2￿dc1￿Rd ,
ii) tend to be too lenient if ￿E <
d￿D+￿Ac2￿Rd￿D+R￿Ac1￿R￿Ac2￿d￿Dc1
d+c2+Rc1￿Rc2￿dc1￿Rd ,
9iii) tend to be too strict if ￿E >
d￿D+￿Ac2￿Rd￿D+R￿Ac1￿R￿Ac2￿d￿Dc1
d+c2+Rc1￿Rc2￿dc1￿Rd .
Proof. Follows from setting ￿
￿ = b ￿ in equations (2) and (4) and solving for ￿E.
There is thus a threshold value for ￿E below which there is excessive lenience but above
which domestic regulation tends to be too tight. In the case when the cross-border shares of
assets and deposits are identical (￿D = ￿A =: ￿), this threshold value can be easily deter-
mined: the efﬁciency condition in Corollary 3 then becomes ￿E = ￿. Thus, if cross-border
ownership equals the cross-border ownership of the other two dimensions, the domestic reg-
ulator always takes efﬁcient decisions regardless the overall level of cross-border activities.
The intuition for this is straightforward: if cross-border engagement is the same along all
three dimensions, the domestic regulator will simply perceive a fraction of both beneﬁts and
costs of intervention. Since this fraction is the same for the costs and beneﬁts, her decision
will not be distorted.
Our analysis focuses exclusively on cross-border activities as the source of inefﬁcient
liquidation decisions. Consequently, we have assumed that intervention decisions maximize
domestic welfare. However, this assumes that the domestic authority responsible for the
intervention decision maximizes the returns to all domestic stakeholders. If this is not the
case, other distortions can arise, which can either strengthen or weaken the initial bias. If,
for example, the authority which decides about interventions is the (domestic) deposit in-
surance fund, intervention behavior will tend to be tougher as the deposit insurer will try to
maximize returns to domestic depositors rather than domestic equity holders. If the central
bank is in charge of intervention decisions, there may likewise be a tendency towards strict
interventions, if the central bank primarily cares about ﬁnancial stability, thus trying to mini-
mize external costs. On the other hand, if intervention decisions are taken by an independent
supervisor, interventions may be relatively lenient, in case of regulatory capture by domestic
equity holders.
103.2 Numerical analysis
The analysis suggests that the intervention decision of a domestically-oriented supervisor
depends in principle on the various dimensions of a bank’s cross-border activities. An inter-
esting question is whether the cross-border activities can also be quantitatively important for
the intervention decision. Only if this is the case, can we expect signiﬁcant welfare losses to
result from cross-border activities.
This subsection contains a simple numerical exercise, with the aim of providing some
sense of the potential quantitative implications of cross-border activities. For this we para-
meterize the model and analyze the intervention threshold for different assumption on cross-
border activities. We assume a return on investment R in period 2 of 1:085 (thus a net return
of 8.5% conditional on success of the project) and a debt share d of 0:9. We take external
failure costs in period 2 as c2 = 0:5. Box 1 summarizes the parameter choices. In Box 2
we report the resulting intervention thresholds b ￿ (calculated from equation (4)) for different
foreign activity levels. We consider four cases: a purely domestic bank and banks that have
respectively 50 percent of either foreign assets, deposits or equity. Next to the intervention
threshold we also calculate the implied CDS spread at the time of intervention.4 We can see
that under the chosen parameters the critical intervention threshold for a domestic bank is
0:946. This translates into a CDS spread of 536bps (by means of comparison, the average
spread of 54 intervened banks considered in the empirical analysis of Section 5 is 484bps).
A bank with 50% foreign deposits sees a higher critical CDS spread of 749bps, consistent
with Proposition 1 that the regulator is then more lenient. The magnitude of the increase in
the critical spread is quite large, suggesting that the presence of foreign deposits can induce
signiﬁcant changes in regulatory behavior. Next, we see that a bank with 50% foreign assets
has a critical spread of about 637bps. Even though the change is smaller than for foreign de-
posits, the implied impact on regulatory lenience remains large. Finally, we see that a bank
that has 50% foreign equity has a critical CDS spread of only 284bps, suggesting a much
4Noting that the expected loss at the critical value is (1￿b ￿)￿1 and assuming that the CDS premium reﬂects
the expected loss on the underlying asset, we obtain a corresponding CDS spread of CDS = 1 ￿ b ￿.
11stricter regulator. Again, the magnitude of the impact is large.
A key implication of our analysis is that a bank with substantial foreign activities still
can be subject to efﬁcient regulatory treatment – as long as its activities are balanced along
the various dimensions. In order to better understand the trade-offs involved in achieving
balance, Figure 1 shows the combinations of the cross-border shares for which the regulatory
intervention is efﬁcient (the x-axis is domestic deposits, the y-axis is domestic assets and
the z-axis (vertical axis) is domestic equity). Above the surface the regulator is too lenient
(domestic equity is too high given the banks cross-border mix of deposits and assets), while
below the surface the regulator is too strict (domestic equity is too low for efﬁciency). We
can see that the trade-offs between the various shares are fairly linear and reasonable. For
example, for most combinations of domestic assets and deposits, there exists a domestic
(equity) ownership share that avoids regulatory inefﬁciency. This implies that achieving
balance is feasible for banks regardless of how international they are. We can also see that
none of the three activity-shares is dominating, that is, each activity share can be offset by
appropriate shares along the other two dimensions.
Taken together, the simple numerical analysis in this section suggests that even though
each individual foreign activity severely distorts regulatory decisions, the distortions can
effectively be avoided if the cross-border activities are balanced along their dimensions.
3.3 The case of external costs in period 1
We now discuss the case that also liquidation at date 1 results in externalities (c1 > 0). In
this case it is easy to show that the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 (domestic deposits increase the
intervention threshold) still holds. However, the other parts of the proposition no longer hold
generally. Take the case of cross-border banking through assets. Previously, higher foreign
assets made the domestic supervisor too lenient as she does not internalize the externalities
that arise abroad when the bank fails (due to c2 > 0). When c1 > 0, however, intervention at
date 1 will also cause externalities, to be shared between the home and the host economy. As
12the domestic supervisor ignores this, she will be too strict. The overall efﬁcient implications
in the presence of foreign assets then depend on the relative size of c1 and c2. If it is reason-
able to presume the c2 is much larger than c1; the part of Proposition 1 applying to foreign
assets will still hold.
The intuition in the case of foreign equity is more of technical nature. Taking derivative




(1 ￿ d) ￿ b ￿(R ￿ d)
￿Dd + ￿E(R ￿ d) + ￿Ac2
: (8)
The sign of the derivative thus depends on (1 ￿ d) ￿ b ￿(R ￿ d). Only if (1 ￿ d) < b ￿(R ￿ d)
does the third part of the Proposition (b ￿
0
(￿E) < 0) still hold. The intuition for this is as
follows: when the regulator intervenes at date 1, domestic equity holders obtain 1 ￿ d for
sure, while if she does not, domestic equity obtains b ￿(R￿d) in expectation. Thus, if b ￿(R￿
d) > 1 ￿ d, gains from continuation are higher for equity. Hence, as the share of domestic
equity increases, the regulator becomes more likely to not intervene and allow the bank to
continue. Note now that the expected gains from continuation depend on the value of the
critical threshold (b ￿) itself. And when c1 becomes large, the threshold will be small (as can
be veriﬁed from equation (4)), making it possible that the ﬁrst effect outweighs the second
one. Again, however, when c1 is sufﬁciently small, this will not be the case and Proposition
1 will continue to hold. Considering our numerical simulation from above, however, we ﬁnd
that the original result for foreign equity is only overturned if ￿ is below 0.55. This would
imply a CDS of 4500bps, which is higher than the CDS spread of any of the intervened banks
in the sample that we use below in empirical analysis.
3.4 Branches versus subsidiaries
We can use the model so far to discuss regulatory implication of organizational forms for
international banks in establishing their presence in host markets. Banks have two main
ways to undertake foreign operations: through branches or by having a foreign subsidiary.
13The key difference between branches and subsidiaries is that in the case of a branch the
supervisor in the country of the parent bank has responsibility (home supervisor), while in
the case of a subsidiary it is the regulator in the country where the supervisor is located (host
supervisor). Our model can be used to understand the relative regulatory attractiveness of
either mode of foreign entry in terms of their welfare properties.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a subsidiary. From the perspective of the host regulator, the
subsidiary has a large share of foreign equity as the proﬁts of the subsidiary will return to
the parent company (low ￿E). Since the subsidiary will typically lend largely domestically
in the host economy, the share of domestic assets is, however, large (high ￿A). In addition,
the subsidiary might also source deposits largely locally (high ￿D). Thus, applying our
model, from the perspective of the host supervisor, cross-border banking largely takes place
through foreign equity ownership. Corollary 2 thus tells us that regulation and supervision
will hence tend to be too strict. On the other hand, intervention costs c1 might be higher in
the case of a foreign subsidiary than a domestically-owned bank, as even in the case of a
self-standing subsidiary, it might be hard to undertake a merger and acquisition or purchase
and assumption operation in an efﬁcient manner given the subsidiary’s links with the parent
bank (to some extent these additional cost can be avoided by ringfencing the subsidiary –
which should serve to reduce the complexity of the intervention).
Consider next branching. Under branching, the home country supervisor has responsi-
bility for supervision and the intervention decision. This supervisor can decide to intervene
in the foreign branch but only jointly with intervention at the parent bank. We distinguish
in the following between two cases: i) the size of the branch is small relative to the parent
bank and, ii), the size of the branch is large relative to the parent bank. To focus ideas, we
also assume that the health of the parent and the foreign branch are fully correlated (in terms
of the model: both have the same realization of ￿ at date 1), an assumption we relax below.
In the case of the parent bank having more than one foreign operation (possibly in different
countries), relative size is deﬁned as the combined size of all foreign branches relative to the
parent company.
14Considerﬁrstthecasewheretheforeignoperationsaresmall. Fromtheperspectiveofthe
home regulator there is hence effectively no cross-border banking. Her liquidation decision
is hence unbiased and efﬁcient. In the case of large foreign operations, things play out as
follows. Due to presence of foreign lending by the foreign branches, there is a substantial
part of foreign assets (￿A low). In addition, there are also foreign deposits (￿D low), while
there is no foreign equity (￿E high). Using corollary 2 we thus obtain that the domestic
supervisor is too lenient. This lenience might be exacerbated if the share of investment that
can be recovered in period 1 increases in ￿A; i.e. the recovery rate on foreign assets is less
than one.
What does this imply for the regulatory desirability of branching versus representation
through a subsidiary? In the case of a small foreign operation, branching is preferred as
this leads to unbiased intervention decisions. When the foreign operation is large, there is
a trade-off. In the case of a subsidiary, intervention in the foreign operation might be too
strict, especially in countries with effective resolution frameworks, i.e. low c1. In the case
of a branch, intervention is too lenient. In either case, this leads to inefﬁcient liquidation
decisions both domestically and abroad.
Conclusion 4 When (total) foreign operations are small relative to the size of the parent
bank, cross-border banking should take place through branching. When (total) foreign op-
erations are large relative to the size of the parent bank, either branches or subsidiaries may
be preferred.
Relaxing the assumption of perfect correlation between ￿ in the home and the host coun-
tries complicates things somewhat in the case of large cross-border activity. If (1￿￿A)￿F +
￿A￿D < b ￿; where F denotes foreign and D domestic, the home country supervisor will in-
tervene. If the two ￿s are sufﬁciently different, this might imply that external costs of failure
resolution are imposed on a country where the banking operation is perfectly healthy (i.e.
high ￿). As the home country supervisor internalizes only ￿Ac2 , the supervisor is more le-
nient towards negative signals from the host countries. This can be further complicated if the
15home country supervisor receives only a noisy signal about ￿ in the host countries. While
not affecting the intervention threshold, it will increase both type I and type II errors and thus
reduce welfare.
Comparing the regulatory effects of branch versus subsidiary structure with the actual
decision of international banks shows that banks with cross-border retail operations prefer
indeed subsidiaries, while banks with small cross-border operations prefer branches (Cerutti
et al., 2007). The recent expansion of some European banks (e.g. Icelandic banks and
Nordea) in the form of branches, however, provides serious regulatory challenges, as we
have shown in this sub-section.
4 Gains and losses from a supra-national supervisor
Until now, we have considered only a domestic supervisor and shown that the efﬁcient and
actual intervention threshold differ in the presence of foreign operations, be they in form
of deposits, equity or assets. When domestic and efﬁcient intervention thresholds differ, a
supra-nationalsupervisorcould, inprinciple, alwaysimprovewelfarebecausethissupervisor
would also take into account the effects that materialize outside the country. However, supra-
national supervision might itself also be subject to imperfections.
First, the global supervisor may have imperfect knowledge about the success probability
at date 1, receiving only a noisy signal.5 Alternatively, we can assume that the domestic
supervisor receives a less noisy signal about the success probability. This means that the
supra-national supervisor, even though having the correct incentives, will make sometimes
wrong decisions due to imperfect knowledge of the success probability. The beneﬁts from
delegation to a supra-national supervisor as it avoids the distorted incentives of domestic su-
pervision have to be weighted against the costs arising because the global supervisor has an
informational disadvantage. Without going into the formal argument, it is relatively easy to
see that larger distortions due to higher shares of either foreign assets or deposits or due to
5See Holthausen and Ronde (2002) for a similar argumentation.
16a higher share of foreign equity tip the welfare balance towards the supra-national supervi-
sor, while larger information disadvantages for the supra-national supervisor tip the welfare
balance towards the national supervisor.
Second, the global supervisor may be less efﬁcient in intervening in either period 1 or in
period 2 (in terms of the model: c1 and c2 are higher when the global supervisor is in charge),
implying higher external costs for the affected economies. Such higher costs could arise
from being farther away from the relevant market and thus being disadvantaged - relative
to a national supervisor - in terms of arranging for a merger and acquisition or purchase
and assumption operation. In addition, intervening and resolving a bank that is present in
markets with different legal frameworks can result in extended and costly resolution, raising
the external costs for the economies in question. However, there is one countervailing effect;
a supra-national supervisor might be in a better position to resolve a ﬁnancial institution that
dominates its home country when operating in a supra-national banking market.6
The comparison between national and supra-national supervision has clear implications
for the current debate on establishing a European-level failure resolution framework. First,
such a regime can only improve the failure resolution for banks whose mix of foreign de-
posits, assets and equity puts them below or above the surface in Figure 1 and for which the
intervention decision is thus distorted. However, such a supra-national framework also has
to relate to the appropriate geographic area. As shown by Osterloo and Schoenmaker (2007)
and Schoenmaker (2010), the largest 25 European have, on average, 25% of their assets out-
side their home country in other European countries. This share ranges, however, from two
percent in the case of BBVA (which has 31% of assets outside Europe) to the Nordea Group,
with 74% of assets outside its home countries in other European countries (and no assets
outside Europe). A European-level supervisor would not help reduce distortions in the case
of banks with signiﬁcant share of assets outside Europe. Second, such a regime can only im-
prove on a purely national resolution framework, if equipped with the necessary means and
resources to resolve a bank efﬁciently. Third, such resolution powers have to come with the
6What is too big-to-resolve for one country might not be the too-big-to-resolve on the European level.
17necessary supervision and monitoring tools; a close relationship with national supervisors is
therefore critical.
5 Empirical analysis
The failure and intervention of Icelandic banks provide an illustrative example for our the-
oretical model. The late intervention by the Icelandic supervisors can be explained by the
high shares of both foreign assets and deposits that Icelandic banks were holding, while eq-
uity was almost exclusively held by domestic agents. The fact that a large share of deposits
were collected through branches rather than subsidiaries exacerbated the situation for host
country supervisors as they had little information and even less power to intervene in time.
In the following, we subject our theoretical model to a formal empirical test by exploring
a sample of 54 banks across 15 countries that failed and were intervened between 2007
and 2009. Speciﬁcally, we use the CDS spread at the time of intervention as indicator of
regulatory lenience or strictness and relate it to the mix of foreign equity, assets and deposits
of these banks, controlling for an array of other bank characteristics. We ﬁrst explain the
methodology, before presenting the data and discussing the results
5.1 Methodology
In our model, information about bank health (￿) is realized at a single point in time (date 1).
This means that the regulator intervenes whenever the realization of ￿ is anywhere below the
critical ￿. In reality, bank health will rather evolve in a more continuous fashion. This sug-
gests that regulators will intervene precisely when the health has deteriorated to the degree
that the critical ￿ is reached – at least if the regulator does not perceive an option value of
not closing down the bank. As a consequence, the CDS spread at the time of intervention
would be an excellent indicator of regulatory lenience or strictness. An option effect may
arise from the fact that a regulator may prefer not to close down a bank that has reached
the critical threshold because there is the chance that the bank will recover in the future and
18end up above the threshold. Such a consideration would simply serve to reduce the critical
threshold at which the regulator intervenes – but the threshold would still depend on the var-
ious dimensions of “foreignness” as outlined in the analysis of the previous section. Hence,
it remains appropriate to study how bank health at the time of intervention (as a measure of
regulatory lenience) depends on foreignness.
Proposition 1 and the discussion above suggest the following testable hypotheses:
1.The CDS-spread at the time of intervention i) decreases in the share of foreign equity,
ii) increases in the share of foreign assets, and iii) increases in the share of foreign deposits.
In the previous section we have argued that the liquidation decisions will be determined
by the overall balance of all variables. We thus construct also a net foreign balance variable,
deﬁned as the difference between the share of foreign equity and the sum of the shares of
foreign assets and deposits. The net foreign balance should be negatively associated with the
lenience of the regulator. Consequently, our second empirical hypothesis is:
2.The CDS-spread at the time of intervention decreases in a bank’s net foreign balance.
We test these two hypotheses with the following empirical speciﬁcation:
yi = ￿ + ￿ ￿ Fi + ￿ ￿ Zi + "i: (9)
where Fi is a vector of cross-border activities (share of foreign deposits (FORD), assets
(FORA) and equity (FORE)) and Zi is a vector of control variables. The dependent variable
yi is the log of the CDS spread (CDS) or the log difference between CDS spread and the CDS
index for the region where the bank is located (CDS / Index). The set of control variables
includes different bank characteristics that can possibly explain the timing of regulatory in-
tervention, but are outside our theoretical model. We include bank size, deﬁned as the log
of bank total assets, as there might be a regulatory bias towards intervening large banks too
late, a phenomenon known as too-big- or too-complex-to-fail. We include the logs of the
tier-1 capital ratio, as regulators face higher pressure to intervene undercapitalized banks,
while lower liquidity, as measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, might provide
19an additional indication of fragility and thus trigger regulatory intervention. We include the
ratio of non-performing loans relative to gross loans as indicator of loan portfolio quality and
thus possible trigger for intervention.
In addition, we control for government ownership and timing of intervention. The con-
siderations when intervening in banks with an equity stake owned by the government are
presumably different ones and this is may be reﬂected in bank CDS spreads. For this reason,
we use a dummy (State) in all speciﬁcations which indicates that the government has a stake
of more than 5 percent in the bank. We also include a crisis dummy (Sep08) in our empirical
model to isolate the effect of Lehman Brothers’ collapse on CDS spreads – as this event
has arguably increased pressure on regulators to intervene weak banks. The bailout dummy
takes the value of 0 prior to September 2008 and 1 afterwards. We expect to ﬁnd a negative
association of Sep08-Dummy and the State-Dummy with the intervention threshold.
Moreover, we include two additional control variables in all speciﬁcations to control for
other possible determinants of regulatory lenience. The dummy CB takes the value of 1 if the
central bank is involved in the supervision of banks and the dummy variable SPV indicates
whether more than one agency is involved in the supervision of banks. As discussed above,
we expect central banks to be more stringent supervisors when being granted with such
supervisory function. In addition, we expect that intervention decisions are more lenient
in the case of multiple supervisors, as coordination problems may make it more difﬁcult to
agree on intervention. CDS spreads at intervention should hence be higher. Data on these
variables come from the World Bank Survey on Banking Regulation (2008).
5.2 Data
Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected bank-level dataset, which contains infor-
mation on cross-border activities of European and U.S. banks that were intervened during
the ﬁnancial crisis in the period between 2007 and 2009. Our main sources of information
on foreign equity, assets and deposits are annual reports and the accompanying notes to bank
20ﬁnancial statements from the ﬁscal year preceding bank intervention. The data on foreign
assets and deposits are complemented by additional data sources provided by SNL Financial
and Bloomberg. When data on foreign assets are missing, we use the share of foreign loans
or deposits instead. In a similar way, we use the available data on foreign assets and loans
as a complement for missing shares of foreign deposits.7 In the case of foreign equity, we
complement missing information in the annual reports with data from Bankscope on owner-
ship by foreign shareholders. Since equity shares are likely to change quickly within a year,
the share of foreign ownership is taken at the last available time period prior to the month of
bank intervention.
We obtain the dates when banks were intervened from Laeven and Valencia (2010). We
measure regulatory lenience or strictness by the CDS spread of the bank at the time of in-
tervention. The idea is that a higher CDS spread at intervention reﬂects that the regulator
has waited for bank health to deteriorate signiﬁcantly before intervening, that is, her critical
￿ is low.8 Such a regulator is lenient in the language of our model. Conversely, a regulator
who tends to intervene already at low CDS spreads is considered a strict regulator. We col-
lect daily observations on ﬁve year senior debt CDS spreads from Datastream before bank
intervention. Ideally we would like to use the values of the CDS spreads prior to the ﬁrst
release of a public announcement on bank intervention. However, the CDS spread at the day
of intervention (or the previous day) may already reﬂect intervention expectations. In order
to mitigate this problem, we use CDS spreads 3 days prior to intervention. As a bank’s CDS
spread might partly be driven by overall market movements, we use the difference (in logs)
between a bank CDS spread and a CDS index as alternative indicator. A CDS index from
Datastream about the European bank sector is used if the bank is located in Europe and the
Datastream CDS index pertaining to the US banking sector - if the bank is located in the US.
This captures the idea that regulators may base their intervention decision not on absolute
7The missing share of foreign assets is replaced with data on foreign loans or deposits in 5 cases. Replace-
ment of missing data on foreign deposits with available data on foreign loans or assets occurs in 4 cases.
8Recalling that ￿ is the likelihood of project success and that the LGD in our model is 100%, the relationship
between CDS spread and threshold lambda is: CDS = 1 ￿ ￿.
21bank health, but on how a bank fares relative to other banks. Looking at the difference to
the CDS index will also help to control for non-credit risk factors in CDS spreads, such as
economy-wide risk and liquidity premia. These premia have been shown to be an impor-
tant part of CDS prices (see Amato (2005) and Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2008))
but should in principle not affect regulatory intervention decisions. The CDS spreads in all
regressions are winsorized at the 5 percent level and taken in logs.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. On average, the cross-border activities of banks
in our sample seem balanced - the mean share of bank foreign equity is 35 percent and the
average share of foreign assets and deposits is 32 percent. The mean of the net foreign
balance, computed as foreign equity share minus foreign deposit share minus foreign asset
share, is ￿30 percent.9 There is a large variation in CDS spreads across banks. While the
mean CDS spread is approximately 500 around the time of intervention, it varies between
51 and 3600 basis points across banks. The U.S.-based bank Washington Mutual Inc. had
the highest CDS spread at time of intervention in the dataset followed by the three Icelandic
banks. On the other tail of the distribution, we have Commerzbank and BNP Paribas with the
lowest CDS spreads at the time of intervention followed by two other French banks - Credit
Agricole SA and Societe Generale SA.
Table2reportscorrelations. Thepair-wisecorrelationsbetweentheCDS-basedmeasures
of lenience and the shares of foreign bank activities have the expected signs but are not
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The CDS spread for example is decreasing in foreign
equity and bank net foreign balance and increasing in the share of foreign assets and deposits
(as well as in the average of their shares). The insigniﬁcance of the correlation estimates
may reﬂect that we need to control for various other factors that inﬂuence the intervention
decision. Next we look at the control variables and their correlation with our measures of
lenience. Bank size, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and the liquid asset
9The intervention threshold for the bank with mean net foreign balance implied by the model of Section
3.2 is 515 bps, which is close to the implied CDS for a purely domestic bank (CDS spread of 526 bps). This
suggests that even though each individual foreign activity share may distort the intervention decision, for the
mean bank the various effects are approximately offsetting.
22ratio have a statistically signiﬁcant and negative correlation with the CDS spread relative to
the CDS spread index and have the expected signs in the correlations with the CDS spread.
There is a high correlation between foreign assets and deposits suggesting that their joint
inclusion in regressions can lead to multicollinearity. Thus in regressions we either use their
average (FORAD) or include them in separate speciﬁcations.
5.3 Results
The results in Table 3 provide evidence consistent with the hypotheses derived from our
model. Here, we relate the CDS spreads at time of intervention with the various foreign
activity shares. In column 1 of Table 3 we ﬁt a model that includes foreign equity and
foreign deposits while in column 2 the share of foreign deposits is replaced with the share of
foreign assets. Due to high correlation between foreign assets and deposits, we include the
average of both in column 3. In column 4, we ﬁt the same model as in column 3 but also
include our set of additional controls.10 The coefﬁcient estimates of the variables of interest
have signs consistent with the theoretical model. Banks’ foreign equity share is negatively
associated with the CDS spread at time of intervention, with coefﬁcient estimates that are
statistically signiﬁcant either at the one or the ﬁve percent level. An increase in the share of
bank foreign equity by one percentage point is associated with an increase in CDS spreads
around the period of intervention between 0.85 and 1.50 percent, ceteris paribus. Similarly,
the coefﬁcient estimates of foreign assets and deposits are signiﬁcant and have the expected
positive sign. An one percentage point increase in those shares is associated with a decrease
in CDS spreads by about 0.90 and 1.25 percent.
In columns 5 to 8 of Table 3 we replace the log of bank CDS spread as the dependent
variablewiththelogoftheCDSspreadrelativetothelogoftheregionalCDSindex. Wecon-
ﬁrm our results. It is important to note that the impact of the different types of cross-border
activities on CDS spreads is of a similar magnitude. For example, the column 4 estimates
10We include some of the variables only in column 4 as they are not available for all banks and thus reduce
the sample size.
23show that an increase in the average share of foreign assets and deposits by one percentage
point is associated with an increase in CDS spreads by about 1.69 percent, suggesting higher
regulatory lenience. The magnitude of the effect of share of foreign equity is of similar size,
but of the opposite direction. An increase by one percentage point in foreign equity is asso-
ciated with a decrease in CDS spreads by about 1.47 percent, ceteris paribus. The similarity
of the coefﬁcients suggests that for balanced banks the regulatory intervention may not need
to be distorted as the effect of one foreign dimension can be easily offset by another one.
Note that a better ﬁt (as indicated by the R-squared) is obtained for the regressions with the
relative CDS spreads.
Turning to the control variables, we ﬁnd that bank size is negatively and signiﬁcantly
associated with the CDS spread at time of intervention, suggesting that regulators are actu-
ally stricter with larger banks, contrary to the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. Banks that were
intervened after September 2008 were intervened at lower CDS spreads, suggesting a stricter
regulatory approach after this event. The negative and signiﬁcant sign on state ownership
suggests a stricter approach of regulators towards these banks. In columns (4) and (8), we
also ﬁnd that a higher tier one capital ratio is associated with later intervention, while high
liquidity is associated with earlier intervention. There is no evidence that the quality of the
loan portfolio is associated with the timing of intervention. We also do not ﬁnd evidence
that the institutional structure of supervision matters for intervention thresholds. Neither
the involvement of the central bank nor the existence of multiple supervisors is signiﬁcantly
associated with the CDS spread at time of intervention.
In addition, we also estimate our model using as dependent variable CDS spreads taken at
different points in times (relative to the intervention date). Table 4 reports regression results
with the average CDS spreads of banks two weeks before intervention as the dependent
variable. The coefﬁcient estimates of the variables of interest are signiﬁcant except the share
of foreign assets in column (2). Comparison of results with Table 3 shows, however, that the
estimates on the foreign activity variables are less precise, with higher standard errors. This
is to be expected since CDS spreads may then not fully reﬂect the deterioration in bank health
24that is very likely to take place just prior to the intervention. We have also run regressions
where we use the average CDS spreads either one week, three weeks or one month prior to
intervention (available on request); as we move farther away from the intervention date, the
coefﬁcient estimates become less precise.
The Table 5 results conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings using the mix of foreign activities
as gauged by the net foreign balance as principal explanatory variable. Panel A presents
results using a simple unweighted version of the net foreign balance deﬁned as foreign equity
share minus foreign asset share minus foreign deposit share. The net foreign balance enters
negatively and signiﬁcantly at the one percent level, suggesting that regulators are stricter the
more biased the foreign activity balance is towards foreign payoffs. Across all speciﬁcations,
an increase by one percentage point in the NFB leads to a decrease in CDS spreads by
between 0.60 and 0.95 percent. The goodness of ﬁt as indicated by the R-squared is again
higher when the relative CDS spreads are used as dependent variables; suggesting that this
may be the more appropriate speciﬁcation.
The results in Table 5 Panel B conﬁrm our ﬁndings with an alternative measure of the
net foreign balance. So far, we have assumed that the inﬂuence of each foreign dimension
on the regulatory intervention is the same (in absolute terms). The analysis in the theoretical
model, however, suggests that these inﬂuences differ (even though they are of similar magni-
tude). We therefore construct an alternative net foreign balance measure that takes this into
account. For this we take as the basis a bank that has foreign shares equal to the respective
sample means. For this bank we compute, using the parameters of section 3.2, the derivative
of the critical lambda with respect to a foreign activity. To obtain the “weights” we then
normalize these derivatives such that their average takes one, that is, equal to the average
value for the unweighted net foreign balance, thus making the coefﬁcient sizes comparable.
The results in Panel B of Table 5 use the weighted version of the net foreign balance. The
coefﬁcient estimates are of the same signiﬁcance and similar size as the results in Panel A,
thus showing little difference between weighted and unweighted versions of the net foreign
balance variables.
25In a ﬁnal step, we test the validity of our intervention model for a sample of 24 banks
that were not intervened during the ﬁnancial crisis.11 As in the case of our sample of in-
tervened banks, the share of foreign activity ranges widely, from zero percent foreign own-
ership to over 80 percent of foreign ownership or foreign assets or deposits. If our model
provides a reasonable description of intervention thresholds, the spreads of non-intervened
banks should tend to be below their predicted intervention threshold. We test this by cal-
culating the predicted intervention thresholds for non-intervened banks (using the estimated
coefﬁcients from regression 3 in Table 3). We then compare these predicted spreads to the
actual spreads of these banks during the sample period. Table 6 contains the results, reporting
the fraction of days for which the actual spreads of a bank are below its predicted intervention
spread. For this, the table separates the sample in a pre- and a post-Lehman Brothers period,
as the predicted intervention threshold is lower for all banks after the Lehman Brothers shock
(see last two columns).
The Table 6 results provides additional support for our theoretical model, as most non-
intervened banks had spreads below the intervention threshold as predicted by their foreign
ownership and asset/deposit shares. On average, 99 percent of daily spreads are below pre-
dicted spreads before Lehman Brothers’ collapse and about 83 percent afterwards. For many
banks, 100 percent of CDS spreads are below the predicted intervention threshold, with a
few outliers, such as the Spanish Banco Popular, the US investment bank Morgan Stanley,
Barclays and the US ﬁnancial conglomerate Metlife Inc. that have a substantial period with
CDS spreads above the predicted threshold after Lehman Brothers’ failure. Overall, this
lends support to our empirical model of the intervention decision since the model (when
estimated on intervened banks) tends to predict that non-intervened banks are below the in-
tervention threshold.
11Bank size and location are used as main criteria for the inclusion of banks in the sample of non-intervened
banks. The data on foreign asset and deposit shares is collected for the ﬁscal year of 2007. Data on foreign
ownership comes from Bankscope.
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This paper uses a very simple model to discuss the trade-offs in bank resolution frameworks
when dealing with cross-border banks. We show that foreign assets and deposits, on the one
hand, and foreign equity, on the other hand, have different implications for the intervention
decisions of home country regulators. Critically, a mix of the three can lead to the same
intervention threshold as a purely domestic bank. We also show that a supra-national super-
visor can improve on the efﬁciency of the intervention decision, but only if equipped with the
necessary mechanisms and information. Our model can inform both the discussion on na-
tional versus supra-national bank supervision and the discussion on the optimal organization
of cross-border activity from the regulator’s viewpoint.
Our empirical estimation using a sample of intervened banks during the recent crisis
conﬁrm the predictions of the model. Banks with a higher share of foreign equity were
intervenedrelativelyearlyastheirﬁnancialhealthdeteriorated, whilebankswithahighshare
of foreign deposits and assets were intervened relatively late. These ﬁndings clearly support
the predictions of the theoretical model that national regulators have biased incentives when
dealing with cross-border banks and have critical implications for the reform of resolution
regimes around the world.
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Box 2: Estimated Intervention Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DOMESTIC 50% FORD 50% FORA 50% FORE
FORD 1 0.5 1 1
FORA 1 1 0.5 1
FORE 1 1 1 0.5
Lambda 0.946 0.925 0.936 0.972
CDS (in bps) 536 749 637 285
Note: Box 1 and Box 2 summarize the set-up and results from our numerical analysis. Box 1 gives an overview of the
parameter choices. Box 2 reports the resulting intervention thresholds for four cases: a purely domestic bank (Column 1),
and banks that have respectively 50 percent of either foreign deposits (Column 2), assets (Column 3) or equity (Column 4).
Next to the intervention threshold we also calculate the implied CDS spread at the time of intervention (in basis points).
30Figure 1: Efﬁcient Regulatory Intervention
Note: This graph shows the combination of the three (domestic) shares for which regulatory intervention is efﬁcient.
X-axis is domestic deposits, y-axis is domestic assets, z-axis (horizontal axis) is domestic equity. Above the surface the
regulator is too lenient (domestic equity is too high given the bank’s cross-border mix of deposits and assets), while below
the surface the regulator is too strict (domestic equity is too low for efﬁciency). We can see that the trade-offs between
the various shares are fairly linear and reasonable. For example, for most combinations of domestic assets and deposits,
there exists a domestic (equity) ownerhip share that avoids regulatory inefﬁciency. This implies that achieving balance
is feasible for banks regardless of how international they are. We can also see that none of the three activity-shares is
dominating, that is, each activitiy share can be offset by appropriate shares along the other two dimensions.
31Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
CDS (3 days b/e intervention) 54 484.05 235.60 692.48 51.70 3626.20
CDS (at day of intervention) 54 486.30 205.17 938.55 56.50 6055.40
CDS / INDEX (3 days b/e intervention) 54 301.32 69.17 686.03 -151.14 3452.72
Foreign ownership share 54 0.35 0.33 0.25 0 1
Foreign asset share 54 0.32 0.31 0.24 0 0.90
Foreign deposit share 54 0.32 0.27 0.25 0 1
Net Foreign Balance 54 -0.29 -0.28 0.47 -1.20 0.64
Average foreign asset and deposit share 54 0.32 0.28 0.23 0 0.87
SIZE (total assets in mil. EUR) 54 464,850 279,465 488,836 5,528 2,586,701
SPV - multiple supervisors 54 0.48 0 0.50 0 1
CB - central bank involved in supervision 54 0.57 1 0.50 0 1
TIER1 capital-asset ratio 46 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.21
Liquid asset share 53 0.22 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.57
NPLs, relative to total loans 46 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08
SEPT08 54 0.67 1 0.48 0 1
State ownership 54 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
Sources: Bank annual reports and ﬁnancial statemens; SNL Financial, DataStream, Bloomberg, BankScope, World Bank
and authors’ calculations. CDS spreads are reported before being winsorized.
Note: This table contains summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis. The sample includes US and
European banks that were intervened in the period between 2007 and 2009 (taken from Laeven and Valencia (2010).
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